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Abstract  
This paper considers the long-standing problem 
of conducting fault-injections experiments to 
establish the ultra-reliability of embedded systems.  
There have been extensive efforts in fault injection, 
and this paper offers a partial summary of the efforts, 
but these previous efforts have focused on realism 
and efficiency.  Fault injections have been used to 
examine diagnostics and to test algorithms, but the 
literature does not contain any framework that says 
how to conduct fault-injection experiments to 
establish ultra-reliability.  A solution to this problem 
integrates field-data, arguments-from-design, and 
fault-injection into a seamless whole.  The solution in 
this paper is to derive a model reduction theorem for 
a class of semi-Markov models suitable for 
describing ultra-reliable embedded systems.  The 
derivation shows that a tight upper bound on the 
probability of system failure can be obtained using 
only the means of system-recovery times, thus 
reducing the experimental effort to estimating a 
reasonable number of easily-observed parameters.  
The paper includes an example of a system subject to 
both permanent and transient faults.  There is a 
discussion of integrating fault-injection with field-
data and arguments-from-design. 
 
Introduction 
Background 
        A long standing problem in the field of ultra-
reliable digital control systems is the design of a fault 
injection experiment for system validation.  Such an 
experiment combines arguments-from-design, field-
data-on-fault-occurrence, and results-from-fault-
injections.  If the system successfully completes the 
experiment, then the system has a given reliability at 
a certain confidence level. 
         Such experiments are often considered 
impossible.  One stated goal is that a flight control 
system has less than one in a billion chance of failure 
during a ten hour flight.  To establish this at the 
equivalent confidence level requires 1000 aircraft 
flying continuously for 21,000 years.  Not even a six 
order magnitude gain in efficiency would make this 
experiment feasible. 
    The first response to this problem is to 
construct a model of the system using our knowledge 
of system structure and component failure rates, but 
this approach has the inherent problem of describing 
system recovery from faults.  System recovery is a 
complex process involving failure modes, application 
software, diagnostic software, and system 
architecture.  No detail of the model can be arbitrarily 
omitted since any detail may have a greater effect on 
the final computation than the small probability to be 
computed.  This has led to more and more complex 
models that are experimentally intractable: some of 
the states and transitions in these models are not 
observable, and the large number of parameters to 
estimate makes achieving a high confidence level 
infeasible. 
    The solution in this paper is to derive a model 
reduction theorem for a class of semi-Markov models 
suitable for describing ultra-reliable embedded 
systems.  The theorem shows a tight upper bound on 
the probability of system failure needs only the 
means of system recovery times, thus reducing the 
experimental effort to simple and easily-observed 
parameters.  
    The typical reliability model assumes the 
system works correctly if the components are fault 
free, and this assumption is often not stated, but we 
will consider it explicitly because we want to create a 
seamless integration of arguments-from-design and 
fault injection.  Arguments-from-design proceed by 
demonstrating that if a system begins in a certain 
state and receives certain inputs then its outputs will 
be acceptable.  Any such argument requires a 
straight-forward architecture.  If the system is non-
reconfigurable, the argument needs to include the 
presence of faulty components.  If the system is 
reconfigurable, the fault-injection experiment must 
observe that reconfiguration places the system in an 
acceptable state.  The argument-from-design can 
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ignore the complex reconfiguration process.  The 
amount of diagnostics established by arguments-
from-design can vary with the system.  In the 
example below, arguments from design are expected 
to cover the first two fault occurrences.   
Procedure 
    The difficult part of a reliability model is a 
description of system recovery.  It is a complex 
procedure involving propagation of the fault through 
hardware; interaction of a fault with diagnostic, 
application, and system programs; comparison 
voting; and possibly system reconfiguration.  In 
addition, if the required probability of system failure 
is extremely small, then no detail of system recovery 
can be arbitrarily ignored since the effect of an 
omitted element could have more effect on the 
system than the probability that is to be computed. 
    These considerations have led to the 
construction of more and more complicated system 
recovery models, but there are several problems with 
this approach.  First, there is no guidance for how 
much detail is needed.  Second, detailed models of 
recovery contain states that are not observable such 
as the propagation of a hardware fault into an 
application program.  Third, detailed models contain 
numerous parameters, and obtaining these parameters 
by experiments would be overwhelming, especially if 
a high confidence level is sought.  
    We offer a solution to this problem by 
deriving a model reduction theorem that yields upper 
and lower bounds for the probability of system 
failure in terms of the means and variances of system 
recoveries where the upper bound uses only the 
means.  These bounds are tight if the system has the 
desirable properties of low component failure rates 
and fast system recoveries.  Furthermore, the upper 
bound only uses the means of system recoveries.  
Since we need only a few, easily observed 
parameters, experiments are brought within reach.     
    The procedure in this paper differs from the 
usual one of (1) constructing a model and (2) 
computing the probability of failure from the model.  
This procedure (1) constructs a model, (2) uses the 
theorem to write a formula for an upper bound for 
system failure in terms of component failure rates, 
operating time, and system parameters, (3) conducts 
experiments to obtain upper confidence bounds for 
the parameters, and (4) combines the formula and 
upper-bounds-for-the-parameters to get an upper 
confidence bound for the probability of system 
failure. 
    It is clear from the above that the system must 
be overbuilt: more reliable than the requirement.  If 
the system has exactly the required probability of 
failure, then any upper bound will be greater than the 
required probability. 
Faults, Field Data, and Diagnostics 
    In this paper, a fault is an input-output 
malfunction of a device.  This definition 
accomplishes two goals.  First, it relates fault 
injection in the lab to the model of fault occurrence in 
the field since, in the field, a device is declared faulty 
when it begins producing observable errors.  Second, 
it lends itself to achieving a high diagnostic level 
which, we will see, is vital for demonstrating ultra-
reliability.  An approach that has a fault as something 
that happens inside a device makes a fault both 
difficult to observe and hard to detect.  
    The actual fault pattern that appears at the 
output may be hard to obtain.  Hence, part of system 
design may be some arrangement for the detection of 
any fault pattern. 
    It is apparent that a system will be designed 
and validated for a given class of faults.  This class of 
faults will have to be stated (and agreed upon) in the 
initial stages of design. 
Applicability and Feasibility 
     From a theoretical point of view, this method 
of designing experiments is widely applicable.  It 
requires that the system use high quality components 
with a constant failure rate.  System recovery is semi-
Markov since the time for system recovery depends 
on the time since fault occurrence.  It also requires a 
system to have a high diagnostic level which is a 
characteristic of highly reliable systems. 
    Feasibility depends on a low overall fault 
occurrence rate and fast recovery.  The experiment 
gathers data on each fault recovery, and a low fault 
occurrence rate implies the number of system-
recoveries during the operating time will not be too 
large.  Fast system recoveries imply only a small 
amount of time is spent observing system recoveries 
in the experiment. 
Outline of Paper 
         The next section contains a literature survey.  
The results in this paper do not depend on any 
previous results in the literature, but applying the 
results in this paper can use the extensive literature 
on the realistic and efficient simulation of faults.  A 
section on preliminaries covers the miscellaneous 
topics of confidence level, field data, terminology, 
and the central limit theorem.  The next section 
presents and derives the model reduction theorem.  
After the theorem is presented, two sections describe 
the system and its path space model for the design of 
the experiment.  Since the theorem is based on paths 
through a model, this last section shows how to 
handle with a model with loops due to transient faults 
by unwinding the loops.  There are potentially an 
infinite number of paths, but almost all the paths will 
have a negligible contribution to system failure 
because of the small probability of more than a 
certain number of fault occurrences.  (A fault 
occurrence can include the dependent case of faults 
in more than one component, and the theorem 
includes this case, although the hypothetical system 
only considers single component failures for a simple 
first example.) 
Literature Survey 
There is a large body of literature on fault 
injection, and this section can only offer a cursory 
description of the efforts.  Nevertheless, it is possible 
to describe what has been done, and then note how 
this paper differs from previous work.  The survey 
below is by topic.  Since most papers discuss several 
topics, most papers appear more than once.   
    There are papers that survey the field and/or 
advocate fault injection as a useful tool 
[9,14,50,51,53].  One question is authenticity--do 
laboratory fault injections mimic actual fault 
occurrences [22, 45, 55].  Some papers use system 
architecture to design efficient and effective fault 
injection [1, 4, 6, 8, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 
39, 40, 42, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 55].  Others use the 
results of fault injections to compare or design 
systems [4, 8, 11, 12, 23 30, 36, 38, 39, 41, 47, 54].  
Fault injections are used to search for design flaws 
[3, 6, 17, 48].  They are used to test software as well 
as hardware [8, 13, 28, 50, 51, 52, 53].  There are a 
number of programs and tools for efficient fault 
injection [2, 7, 10, 22, 24, 26, 28, 31, 35, 43, 45, 49, 
55, 56].  There are efforts to model fault propagation 
and effect [5, 7, 12, 17, 19, 22, 23, 27, 28, 30, 32, 36, 
38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 47, 50, 52].  Coverage is a 
popular topic, and the meaning of coverage can vary 
from simple detection to complete system recovery 
and reconfiguration [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 29, 31, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 
42, 43, 44, 54, 55].  There are papers about the 
efficient estimation of coverage [15, 16, 18, 27, 36, 
43], and there are papers about incorporating 
coverage into a reliability model [5, 13, 47]. 
    This paper is a modest effort, but different 
from all the above.  It considers only hardware.  The 
goal is to derive results in probability that permit 
establishing ultra reliability (for hardware) with a 
moderate fault injection effort.  This paper is 
different enough from previous efforts that it is 
technically self contained. 
Preliminaries 
Conducting the Experiment  
    The trials in an experiment consist of injecting 
certain faults and observing system recovery.  
Recovery must include detection and identification.  
If the system is reconfigurable, recovery must include 
reconfiguration.  Any trial can last only a short period 
of time, and the insistence that the system 
successfully recovers within this period is a stringent 
one.  This requirement can be relaxed, but at the cost 
of additional computational effort [57].  As an 
introductory effort, this paper accepts the simpler, 
although more demanding, requirement.   
    From the time of fault injection until 
recovery, the system is monitored to insure it 
maintains process control.  Acceptable control 
depends on the environment, but any deviation 
outside acceptable control is considered system 
failure. 
Overall confidence level 
    A confidence level is a quantitative measure 
of the quality of an experiment.  If there are random 
elements present, it is possible for an experiment to 
mislead us, and the confidence level gives the 
probability that the experiment has misled us.  A 99% 
confidence level means that there is a 0.99 (or more) 
chance that the experiment leads us to the correct 
conclusion.  This paper takes the position that the 
quality of the experiment should match the 
importance and quality of what is being established.  
In the following if the requirement is that the 
probability of system failure be p (or less), then the 
experiment is designed to have a confidence level of 
100(1-p)%. 
    Since a reliability model has numerous 
parameters to be estimated, the final confidence level 
is a combination of the confidence level for each of 
the parameters.  The result, which does not assume 
independence, is as follows [58]. 
 
Suppose [  i ,  i ] is a 100(1-h i )% confidence 
interval for p i for  1in, then  ([  1 ,  1 ],..., [  n ,  
n ] )  is a 100(1- h 1 - ... - h n )% confidence interval 
for (p 1 ,..., p n ). 
 
Hence, the more parameters to be estimated, the 
higher the confidence level on each must be to 
maintain an overall high confidence.  This is one of 
the motivators for the model reduction theorem in 
next section and the reason for introducing 
integrated-recovery-distributions when designing the 
experiment. 
Confidence Level for Lack of Diagnostics 
    We wish an upper confidence bound u for the 
probability that a fault is not detected, which is 
denoted by (1-D) in the models below.  Assuming all 
faults are detected in n trials, the number of trials 
needed to establish u as a upper bound at the 100( 1 – 
alpha)% level is 
( 1 – u ) n  = alpha                                           (1) 
This can be expanded to solve for n in case some 
faults are undetected during the experiment by adding 
more terms in the binomial expansion.  For instance, 
the number of trials n needed to establish that n is an 
upper bound for (1-D) at the 100( 1 – alpha )% level 
if zero or one faults are undetected is given by 
( 1 – u ) n   +   n( 1 – u ) n-1  = alpha.               (2) 
    The upper and lower bounds are derived in 
section four by considering all the paths from initial 
states to system-failure states.  It is a feature of this 
path-space approach that for an upper bound on 
system failure we also need an upper bound for D, 
the probability that a fault is detected.  We will take 1 
as a 100% upper confidence bound on D.   
Confidence Level for Means of System 
Recoveries 
    The upper bound on the probability-of-
system-failure uses the averages of the system 
recoveries, and confidence intervals for averages are 
derived from the central limit theorem that says a 
sample average is approximately normally 
distributed.  A problem is that the confidence levels 
are extremely high, and the normal approximation 
may or may not be accurate enough even if the 
sample size is large.  This statistical point requires 
more study, and this is a general problem.  There are 
a few results [58], but the consensus is that “no 
systematic studies along this direction seem to have 
been done” [62].  
Two Results on Fault Injection 
    We use two results in probability for fault 
injection [59].  Suppose components have failure 
rates λ 1 , … , λ n .  The probability that component j 
has failed given a component has failed is 
                 λ j  /( λ 1 + … + λ n ).                       (3)              
    When injecting a fault, the experimenter will 
allow a time S for system recovery, and if the system 
does not recovery within that time, it will be declared 
a system failure.  When injecting a double fault, the 
time of injection is given by the uniform distribution 
on [0, S]. 
The Model Reduction Theorem 
    A reliability model can be regarded as a 
collection of paths from the initial state (or states) to 
the failure state (or states).  By the semi-Markov 
property, an arbitrary path can be arranged as in 
figure 1.  At first glance, such an approach might 
appear to not include transient faults or correlated 
faults, but transient faults can be handled by 
unwinding the loops.  The unwinding process will 
end as the probability of more fault occurrences 
becomes negligible.  Correlated faults can be handled 
by letting a transition represent the failure of more 
than one component. 
    In the first line of figure 1, the successful 
transitions are constant rate processes competing 
against other constant rate processes.   In the second 
line the successful transitions are general 
distributions (system recovery distributions) 
competing against other general distributions and 
constant rate processes.  In the third line the 
successful transitions are constant processes 
competing against general distribution functions and 
other constant rate processes.  For notation 
 
          D(T) = Probability of traversing the path in 
figure 2 by time T 
W(T) = Probability of reaching state  B 1  by 
time T 
p(F i ) = Probability the transition  dF 1,i  is 
successful 
( F i ) = First conditional moment of  dF 1,i 
 2( F i ) = Conditional variance of  dF 1,i 
(C j ) = First moment of the holding time in 
state C j 
 2 (C j ) = Variance of the holding time in C j. 
 
The probability  W(T)  is easy to compute.  A 
convenient approximation which is used in section 
VI, but whose derivation is left to the reader is 
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Figure 1.   Arbitrary path in a semi-Markov model 
                                                                                                            
The proof uses two standard results in 
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Theorem: With the assumptions and notation as 
above, upper and lower bounds for reaching state D 
in figure 1 by time T are 
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Proof of the theorem 
Let  q(t)  be the density function for the 
probability of reaching state  B1  of figure 1.  The 
derivation is easier to follow if we assume the 
recovery distributions have density functions, and we 
will use f(x) dx instead of dF(x) although the theorem 
holds in the general case. 
     
   
   
   
   
(10)dtdxdxdydy
)y(G-1)y(G-1
ee
)y(G-1)y(G-1
ee
)(xf)x(F-1)x(F-1
e
)(xf)x(F-1)x(F-1e
q(t)D(T)
1m1n
ncn,nn,1
y-y-x-x-t-T
0
y-y-
n
1c1,11,1
x-x-t-T
0
y-y-
1
mm,1mbm,mm,2
x-t-T
0
x-
11,1
t-T
0 1b1,11,2
x-
T
0
n
1-n1m1 nnnn
1
m1 1111
m
1-m1 mm
1
11























x
                                               
 
Working with just the limits of integration 
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It remains to establish four inequalities ((14) 
through (17) below). 
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The theorem is proved by substituting these 
inequalities into the previous inequalities for  D(T). 
Description of the Nonreconfigurable 
Sevenplex Example 
General Description 
         The architecture is a nonreconfigurable 
sevenplex where each module consists of a computer-
on-a-chip plus six transmission lines to the other 
modules.  There are seven computers and forty two 
links.  The requirement is to establish that there is 
less than one chance in a billion of failure during a 
ten hour flight, and to establish this at the 100(1-1e-
9)% confidence level.  The permanent and transient 
failure rates for the computers are 1e-6/hour and 1e-
5/hour respectively.  The rates for the links are 1e-
5/hour and 1e-4/hour. 
Masking, Detection, and Identification 
The general principles for masking arbitrary 
faults are: (1) 3k+1 components are needed to reach 
consensus in the presence of k (arbitrarily malicious) 
faults and (2) any message from a good component 
can be identified as being from that component [63, 
64]. 
 
    For both diagnostics and Byzantine resilience, 
this sevenplex has the following features. 
(i) The computational and decision 
making components are computers-on-a-
chip.  The faults (input-output 
malfunctions) appear on the output 
registers, and any incorrect output will be 
transmitted to another computer. 
(ii) Communication is point-to-point 
for all the computers.  Hence, any good 
computer knows from which computer it 
received a correct message.  It can, 
however, require some time to determine if 
the incorrect message arises from a faulty 
computer or a faulty link. 
Hence, we assume that arguments-from-design 
have established the following. 
The system can tolerate faulty 
components as long as there are no 
more than two faulty components 
currently in the system. 
    In addition, faults are characterized as input-
output malfunctions in order that fault injection in the 
lab corresponds to observed fault occurrence in the 
field.  Since the total connectivity of the system 
conveys any malfunction to the other processors, the 
good processors can detect any fault occurrence.  As 
long as there are five good processors, the good 
processors can identify the source of the fault with 
one exception.  If processor A tells the other 
processors it has received a faulty message from 
processor B and the other processors have received a 
correct message from processor B, then the likely 
culprit is the link between A and B.  It is possible, 
however, that processor A has sent a malicious 
message.  For this reason, processor A is also 
suspect, and both processor A and the link will have 
to be examined during the maintenance check.  
During the experiment, declaring the link as faulty 
will be considered a successful recovery.  During the 
experiment and run-time, the most damage such a 
malicious processor can do is shut down all the links 
to it.  
    The arguments have not established the time it 
takes to detect and identify the faulty units, nor do 
they make any assertions about system behavior if 
three or more faults are present.  This part belongs to 
the experimental effort. 
The Path Space Model  and Design of 
the Experiment 
Outline 
The construction of the model and the design of 
the experiment are intertwined.  There are three steps. 
1. Preliminary experiments are conducted 
to get initial estimates of the model parameters. 
2. These initial estimates are used to 
construct a model.   
3. The model is used to determine the 
number and types of fault injections required. 
Preliminary Experiments 
Assume the preliminary values for the mean and 
variance of system recovery are given in the first 
three columns of Table 2.  Recovery from a computer 
transient takes longer because of the need to rewrite 
the internal stored values.  The model will be 
constructed and the experiment designed on the 
assumption that the initial estimates are reasonably 
accurate.  If these estimates are too large, then the 
model and experiment will be inefficient.  If these 
parameters are too small, then the model and 
experiment will not be adequate. 
    This discussion assumes, for convenience, 
that the final estimates match the initial estimates.     
Integrated Recovery Functions 
The typical model has a different recovery 
function for each type of fault, but this creates a 
proliferation of parameters, and we have seen in the 
subsection on combining confidence levels that this 
increases the number of trials needed to maintain a 
high overall confidence level.  Hence, each recovery 
function in the model below integrates recovery from 
several types of faults although a distinction is made 
between permanent and transient faults since 
permanent faults remain in the system and additional 
data must be collected when there are three or more 
faults in the system.   
    Recovery integration is handled by 
proportional sampling.  For instance, recovery H1 in 
figure 2 handles both processor and link permanent 
faults.  Suppose  λ  is the failure rate for processors, φ 
is the  failure rate for links, and N is the number of 
faults to be injected to obtain the parameters for  H1.  
Then the experiment will inject  7γ/(7γ + 42φ) N 
processor faults and 42φ/(7γ + 42φ) link faults.   
    Recovery H2  handles a permanent fault 
followed by a transient fault.  With the notation of γ 
for processor-rate, φ for link-rate, p for permanent, 
and t for transient, the proportions are given in table 
1. 
Table 1. Proportion of Injected Faults  
                for Recovery Distribution H2    
Type 
 
Proportion 
Processor- 
Processor 
     
           
  
     
           
 
Processor- 
Link 
     
           
  
     
           
 
Link- 
Processor 
     
           
  
     
           
 
Link- 
Link 
     
           
  
     
           
 
 
Description and Figures for the Model 
Based on the preliminary results from 
exploratory fault injections and the accompanying 
calculations, the system model was constructed, and 
the first part of this model is shown in figure 2  The 
construction of this model illustrates the difference 
between constructing a conservative model for ease 
of experimentation and constructing a more accurate 
model for a more precise calculation of system 
failure. 
    The model begins in state 1 and transitions to 
state 2 with a permanent fault and to state 17 with a 
transient fault which is indicated by a dashed arrow.  
The type of permanent fault injected is chosen 
randomly from a multinomial distribution according 
to the ratio as described in the previous section.  
These fault injections yield a mean and variance for 
H1, the recovery distribution for the first permanent 
fault that occurs. 
    An occurrence of a permanent fault while 
recovering takes the system to state 3.  Since this is 
expected to be a rare occurrence, the model ignores 
system recovery although the system can tolerate two 
faults.  The occurrence of a third fault in state 3 is 
considered a system failure  F1.  The occurrence of a 
transient fault in stated 2, however, has a probability 
large enough that the model must track it – to state 4 
where H2 is the recovery model for both faults.  A 
third fault occurrence in system 4 is unlikely enough 
that it will be considered system failure.  A 
successful recovery from state 4 takes the system to 
state 5 where a permanent is treated similarly to a 
permanent failure in state 2 and a transient failure 
takes the system to the recovery state 7.  In state 7, 
any fault occurrence is taken as a system failure.  
Recovery goes to state 8 where there is one 
permanent fault in the system.  In state 8, any 
additional faults are unlikely enough that system 
recovery is not tracked and two additional faults 
place the system in failure state F5. 
    Recovery from the first permanent fault takes 
the system to state 10 where a permanent fault leads 
to state 11 (and a transient fault to state 58 although 
this part of the model is not shown).  In state 11, any 
failure that occurs during system recovery is 
considered a system failure.  System recovery goes to 
state 12.  Since there are now two faults in the 
system, we are no longer guaranteed the system will 
correctly handle a fault.  A correctly-handled 
permanent fault takes the system to state 13 where 
the recovery process is ignored and an additional 
fault is declared system failure.  A correctly-handled 
transient fault takes the system to state 14.  In state 
12, an incorrectly-handled fault takes the system to 
failure state F7.  The model is simplified and the 
probability of failure bounded above by having the 
transition to F7  use ω, the sum of all failure rates. 
    In state 14, the occurrence of any fault during 
system recovery is declared a system failure.  
Recovery goes to state 15 where there are two faults 
in the system.  The occurrence of a fault that is not 
correctly handled (not detected) takes the system to a 
failure state.  The occurrence of a fault that is 
correctly handled takes the system to state 16 where 
system recovery is ignored and another fault 
occurrence is considered system failure.  The rest of 
the model is similar.  The complete model consists of 
69 operational states plus 42 failure states.  Because 
of a lack of space only the first 16 operational states 
and 11 failure states are displayed in figure 2.  The 
dotted lines indicate transitions to states not included 
in this first part. 
Fault Injection for Non-recovery 
Non-recovery refers to the improper handling of 
a fault which could range from non-detection to 
removing a good component to system crash.  In the 
complete model, there are six failure states for 
improper handling of a fault with two of them present 
in the model in figure 1: F 7   and F 10.  In the previous 
states (12 and 15), the system has two faults present 
and cannot be guaranteed to handle the third fault 
correctly.  The algebraic upper bounds for these two 
states are 
F 7 <   
  
 
     (    )                               (18) 
F 10 <    
  
  
       (     )                       (19) 
                       
An upper bound of 1e-3 for (    ) gives an upper 
bound for  F 7 of 1.43e-10, and the upper of 1e-3 can 
be established at the 100(1 – 2e-10)% confidence 
level with 22,322 successful trials.  An upper bound 
of 1e-2 for  (     ) gives an upper bound of 1e-11 
for  F 10, and the upper bound of 1e-2 can be 
established at the 100(1 – 1e-11)% confidence level 
with 2,520 successful trials. 
 It‟s not shown because of a lack of space, but a 
conditional probability of non-recovery of 1e-2 is 
also sufficient for the other four non-recovery failure 
transitions, and as before this requires 2,520 
successful trials for each of them to give each a 
confidence level of 100(1 – 1e-11)%.   The total 
contribution of the non-recovery states to system 
failure is 1.89e-10, and the stated trials establish this 
at the 100(1 – 2.5e-10)% confidence level. 
 
Fault Injection for Recovery Distributions 
In the complete model, there are 22 recovery 
functions whose means must be estimated.  The first 
five recovery distributions are displayed in figure 2.  
The computations actually use the upper bounds for 
the means which need to be estimated at some 
confidence level.  If each of the 22 upper bounds are 
estimated at the 100(1 – 3e-11)%  level, then the total 
contribution to the lack of confidence for the 
distribution functions is 6.6e-10.  Combined with the 
lack of confidence for non-recovery of 1.89e-10, this 
gives an overall confidence level for the experiment 
of 100(1 – 8.49e-10)% which satisfies the desired 
goal of a 100(1 – 1e-9)%  level.   
As mentioned before, there is a paucity of results 
about the tails of the normal approximation.  Hence, 
we will derive a conservative upper-bound for the 
tails of the normal.  We begin by bounding the 
normal density function above with 
        ( )   
 
√    
       (  
  
 
 )                (20) 
when x > 1.  We have 
          ∫  ( )       
 
    
                     (21) 
which says that a sample-mean plus 6.83 sample-
standard-deviations gives an upper confidence bound 
of 100( 1 – 3e-11 ) %  . 
 Continuing to be conservative, we will use the 
estimated-mean plus the estimated-standard-deviation 
as an upper bound for the mean.  If there are 10,000 
trials, the standard deviation of the estimator is one-
hundredth of the population-standard-deviation.  
Hence, we are using the sample-average plus 100 
sample-standard-deviations (instead of 6.83 of them). 
Table 2 displays the estimated means and 
standard deviations in seconds for the five system 
recoveries depicted in figure 2.  Recoveries that 
handle transients take longer because of system 
restoration.  Table 3 displays the eleven failure states 
in figure 2.  The upper bound computations use the 
upper confidence bounds for the means which is the 
estimated means plus the estimated standard 
deviations.     
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Figure 2. First Part of the path Space Model for the Sevenplex
  
     Table 2. Estimates for Recovery Distributions 
System 
Recovery 
Estimated
Population
Mean 
Estimated 
Population 
Standard 
Deviation 
H1 2 2 
H2 6 4 
H3 4 2 
H4 2 2 
H5 4 2 
 
Table 3.  First Eleven Failure States 
 State Algebraic Upper Bound Value 
F 1   
 
      (  ) 
4.76e-11 
F 2         (  )  (  ) 2.64e-13 
F 3   
 
        (  )  
6.77e-13 
F 4   
 
        (  )  (  ) 
3.39e-15 
F 5   
  
         (  )  
 
7.95e-14 
F 6   
 
      (  )  
4.76e-11 
F 7   
 
     (    )  
1.43e-10 
F 8   
  
        
1.52e-10 
F 9   
 
        (  )  
1.02e-12 
F 10   
  
       (     )  
1.52e-11 
F 11   
   
         
1.43e-11 
 
Summary for Fault Injections 
Summing all the upper bounds for all the failure 
states gives 5.99e-10.  The total number of fault 
injections required is 257,442.  If successful, the 
experiment has established the probability of failure 
is less than 1e-9 at an equivalent confidence level.  
Summary 
We approach the problem of designing fault-
injection experiments by reducing the number of 
parameters to be estimated.  The major result is a 
bound on the probability of system failure in terms of 
the means and variances of the recovery distributions.  
The upper bound uses only the means, and this bound 
is tight if the component failure rates are low and 
system recovery is fast.  Another technique is 
integrated system recoveries where a single recovery 
distribution describes the system‟s reaction to several 
types of faults.  We derive the bounds and apply the 
techniques to the design of an experiment for a 
redundant system.  A number of problems remain: 
collection of field data, the accuracy of the normal 
approximation for extremely high confidence levels, 
and fault-identification in a Byzantine scenario. 
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